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Book Reviews
of Species, and to remediate the distortions of the history and role of biostratigraphy that have been and
continue to be put forth by the proponents of flood
geology, will profit from these volumes.
Reviewed by Ralph Stearley, Professor of Geology, Calvin College, Grand
Rapids, MI 49546.

THE GREAT RIFT: Literacy, Numeracy, and the
Religion-Science Divide by Michael E. Hobart.
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2018. xiv
+ 506 pages, with appendices, endnotes, and index.
Hardcover; $39.95. ISBN: 9780674983632.
Michael Hobart’s book The Great Rift presents a novel
and provocative perspective on the age-old conflict
between religion and science. In his words:
My central thesis may be baldly and succinctly stated:
the shift between two distinct information technologies—literacy and numeracy—resides at the source
of how science and religion went their separate ways,
producing the Great Rift between them. (p. 4)

To be clear, Hobart does not specifically address
the alleged discord between science and religion
but delineates how a chasm (his word) opened up
to drive them apart. Nevertheless, Hobart holds
that as life became ever more secularized, religion
became less relevant to science and was “not so
much conquered as ignored” (p. 10), so that “from
the late nineteenth century to our own times we have
reached the point where observers and participants
alike … have come to view the widening separation
between science and religion as an impasse, or even
a war zone” (p. 323).
To support his thesis, Hobart fleshes out and refines
some research begun two decades earlier with a colleague on transitions between the three stages in the
history of information technology: literacy, numeracy, and computerized information processing. The
result here is a well-researched book, based on a
lifetime of work, that extensively examines medieval
and Renaissance developments in mathematics as
well as Galileo’s seminal role in the rise of modern
science. The detailed scholarly treatment given these
topics, which we cannot adequately recapitulate
here, makes the book well worth its modest price,
completely aside from its take on the science-religion
divide.
Hobart begins his narrative with a brief look at the
ancient world, which introduced and developed
the information technology of recorded language.
Greek writing is epitomized by its literature and
philosophy, which make extensive use of definition
and classification to capture the essence of things.

Volume 71, Number 2, June 2019

Aristotle systematically codified forms of deductive reasoning based on this type of thinking in his
logic. Medieval schoolmen later adopted this mode
of knowledge acquisition in their educational practices and intellectual debates. Classification and fine
distinctions permeated the writings of those who
studied the quadrivium (arithmetic, music, geometry, and astronomy) as well as the writings of those
dedicated to more advanced topics in theology and
philosophy.
During this time period, there was a methodological unity overall to science and religion. Thinkers
described the observed behavior of natural phenomena in terms of causes related to their essential
natures, leaving room for divine purposes at the
head of it all. They employed the same sort of reasoning that explained the structure of the natural world
to incorporate religious ends and means. Science and
religion in medieval Europe formed a fairly harmonious whole.
As people began to use mathematics more consistently in the late Middle Ages and Renaissance in
order to relate things in everyday arenas such as
commercial transactions, music, perspective painting, and astronomy, the explanatory focus for
natural phenomena moved away from appealing to
the intrinsic nature of things to demonstrating how
they functioned quantitatively. Mathematically relating numerical features of events or activities via ratio
and proportion (the rule of three was an omnipresent mainstay) became the new mode of accounting
for natural phenomena. This approach was fruitfully
employed by Galileo in his scientific analysis of terrestrial motion, yielding his times-squared law for
falling bodies and parabolic paths for projectiles.
Such an approach left both traditional philosophy
and theology on the outside, creating a fault line
between science and religion. Galileo’s clash with
the Roman Catholic Church over the factual status
of Copernican astronomy, the nature of scientific
demonstration, and the legitimacy of theological
incursions into science only exacerbated this rift.
Hobart attributes the new analytic approach in
natural philosophy to changes in information technology, indeed, to the rise of numeracy. He sees
developments within mixed/applied mathematics
during the Renaissance and early modern period as
embodying a new understanding of the nature of
mathematics and the role of symbols. Using terms
proposed in 1959 by Jagjit Singh (but for distinguishing formalistic late nineteenth- and twentieth-century
mathematics from its more concrete antecedents),
Hobart brands classical and medieval mathematics
as “thing mathematics” and Renaissance and early
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modern mathematics as “relation mathematics.” This
characterization works to some extent, but it has
shortcomings.
Classical mathematics was certainly about mathematical entities encountered in everyday life (numbers,
spatial figures), but it also treated their basic properties (being prime, being isosceles) and relations
(being divisible by, being congruent to). Hobart
correctly notes that late medieval, Renaissance, and
early modern mathematics made extensive and
productive use of relations such as ratio and proportion (a significant part of what qualifies them as
being relation mathematics) to formulate functional
dependencies, but these relations were also prominent in earlier mathematics—in the works of Euclid,
Archimedes, Apollonius, Heron, and Ptolemy, and
even in the mathematical practice of earlier cultures.
Another aspect of the new relation mathematics,
as Hobart conceptualizes it, is an emphasis on the
use of abstract or empty symbols. In one sense, this
was not new. As far back as the end of the third
millennium BC, for instance, the Mesopotamian
sexagesimal place-value system made abstract computations possible, so that the differing concrete
metrological systems still in use could be bypassed.
But, in another sense, applying this characterization
to late medieval, Renaissance, and early modern
mathematics is anachronistic. Hindu-Arabic numerals referred to quantities such as goods, weights, and
monetary value in commercial arithmetics; musical
notation denoted temporal duration, pitch relations,
harmonies, and time signatures; and letters used in
the analysis of motion stood for speeds, times, and
distances. More-abstract symbols were introduced
in algebra by Viète and others to stand for numerical operations as well as unknown and known
quantities, and these were used to formulate and
solve equations, but they were not vacuous—they
had numerical meaning in some assumed domain
of quantities. Furthermore, while Viète made some
major notational advances in algebra for solving
equations prior to 1600, Galileo remained rooted
in an older geometric form of ratio arithmetic that
he learned from the recently recovered Book V of
Euclid’s Elements. In his earlier work, Hobart highlighted Viète’s role in the new numeracy, but here
Galileo is his protagonist. Galileo does use mathematical symbolism to analyze relations among
physical quantities, but these are neither empty of
meaning nor related by equations.
However, there is some validity to Hobart’s assertion
that the symbols of modern relation mathematics
were becoming empty. As mathematics was increasingly being used to quantify empirical realities such
128

as cost, distance, harmony, time, speed, and so on,
time-worn metaphysical and occult connotations of
numbers and spatial configurations became superfluous, and, as a result, symbolic representations
were emptied of enchanted meaning. This practice
became more widespread as time went on, though as
Hobart acknowledges, it was not uniformly followed
even by the start of the 1600s. Mystical associations
of mathematics were often deemed as important
as practical applications; in fact, this development
encouraged some to believe that mathematics would
unravel the secrets of nature. Kepler’s astronomical
writing, for example, contains hard-nosed calculations about elliptic planetary orbits and also religious
and mystical ruminations about Platonic solids and
the ability to think God’s thoughts after him.
More could be said about Hobart’s defense of his
thesis—particularly his idiosyncratic use of the
notions of cardinality and ordinality in connection
with mathematicians beginning to join the fields of
number and space in their practice of mixed mathematics—but I will end with a question and follow
that with a few concluding remarks.
What is gained, I wonder, by conceptualizing the
transformation of natural philosophy (from using
Aristotelian teleological argumentation to employing
mathematical analyses of functional dependencies)
as a sweeping shift in information technology,
exchanging words for empty quantitative symbolism? Why is this not seen instead, for instance, as a
renewed neo-Pythagorean/Archimedean emphasis
on the primacy of quantifying (mathematization)
combined with a more experimental and mechanistic bent in physical investigations? That is, why
concentrate so exclusively on the how of information technology—“the humanly constructed screen
between the knowing mind and the world outside”
(p. x)—rather than on the what of the discovered
numerical connections between meaningful content?
Hobart would no doubt respond that the latter does
not occur without the former and that his stated aim
is to determine the extent to which a change in information technology is implicated in the new mode of
doing science, but I think more could have been done
with developments on the religion and philosophy
side of the divide to contextualize the shift.
Hobart successfully documents the changing methodology of science in the early modern period,
especially in his expert examination of Galileo’s
work, but his thesis does not account for other important issues concerning the relationship of science and
religion, even in this time period. I remain convinced
that much more than information technologies are
involved in the rise of modern science and its conPerspectives on Science and Christian Faith
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nection to religion. To be fair, some of these factors
are acknowledged in passing by Hobart. He admits
that changing attitudes toward the roles of religion
and philosophy in the pursuit of natural knowledge
were influenced by historical developments such as
the rise of nominalism, the Reformation, Renaissance
humanism, the revival of Platonism, gradual secularization, and so on, but these lie mostly outside the
scope of his thesis. More importantly, Hobart does not
probe the significant ways that Christian religion—in
both its medieval and early modern versions—provided a hospitable intellectual environment in which
modern science could develop and thrive, Galileo’s
conflict with the church notwithstanding. Readers
who recognize God as the author of nature (and of
creation more broadly) will not be persuaded by
Hobart’s allegation that “the deep incompatibility
of religion and science” is now “simply too great to
overcome” (p. 323). Distinct epistemic methodologies
or information technologies do not automatically
create territorial conflicts, and what discord there
is, can often be attributed to other factors, such as
the opposition between Christian faith and a strong
commitment to naturalism.

the book fulfills its purpose: to give a microphone to
the multiplicity of dimensions in this arena, all without reducing or overemphasizing one aspect over
another.

Reviewed by Calvin Jongsma, Professor of Mathematics Emeritus, Dordt
College, Sioux Center, IA 51250.

Andrew Torrance, in “Not Knowing Creation,”
attempts to clarify methodological naturalism.
There’s much to comment on here, but the essay is
more thoughtful and persuasive than those in Theistic
Evolution (2017) edited by J. P. Moreland et al. on the
same topic. Inevitably, there remain loose ends—
especially with regard to the main assumptions of
this discussion, such as models of God and creation,
“special divine action,” and how science done by
Christians is substantially different than that done
by non-Christians. Torrance writes, for example, that
“there should be a difference between the way in
which the Christian scientist and the naturalistic scientist approach and interpret the structure, behavior,
and history of the natural world” (p. 101); this view
gets the ball rolling but does not take us too far.

ORIGINS
KNOWING CREATION: Perspectives from Theology, Philosophy, and Science by Andrew B. Torrance
and Thomas H. McCall, eds. Grand Rapids, MI:
Zondervan, 2018. 341 pages. Paperback; $39.99. ISBN:
9780310536130.
The late modern unfurling of interdisciplinary studies continues to produce innumerable volumes. The
relationship between theology and science is no
exception. Zondervan recently released two volumes
exploring “perspectives from theology, philosophy, and science,” edited by Andrew Torrance and
Thomas McCall, each with over a dozen qualified
contributors. The first is Knowing Creation and the
second Christ and the Created Order. This review looks
at the first.
As one skims the introduction, it seems the volume might be just another opinionated survey of
the stale debates over “creation, science, and intelligent design.” But in reading through each chapter,
it quickly becomes apparent that the book is far
broader. In fact, readers generally interested in and
familiar with this intersection of disciplines might
find it a simple pleasure to read (as I did), without
worrying about locating arguments within a contemporary context and making judgments. At any rate,
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It is not possible to review each contribution, but I do
want to highlight points from some of them to give
readers a sample of the contents.
Christoph Schwoebel, in “We Are All God’s
Vocabulary,” focuses on a topic vital for any discussion about interacting disciplines: language.
Although many of us tend to think we understand
basic concepts such as “metaphor” and “analogy,”
we often don’t. “Metaphors do not simply add a coat
of meaning to things which underneath remain what
they are,” he writes. “They change the way things
are for us and how we are to relate to them” (p. 49).
In a modern age that privileges the literal, propositional, and measurable/quantifiable and downplays
the symbolic, metaphorical, and qualitative (that is,
“it’s just a metaphor”), getting a handle on the linguistic dimensions of the science-theology enterprise
cannot be overstated.1

John Walton, in “Origins in Genesis,” condenses
some of his published research. In contrast to modern
thought, he presses the superficiality of the natural/
supernatural distinction. This default way of thinking simply is not part of biblical consciousness. “We
cannot claim the Bible says something that makes no
sense in the original context; it cannot make a categorical distinction if it does not have the categories”
(p. 109). Walton is by no means the first to make this
observation, but his repeated focus is justified given
that many of those speaking and publishing on this
topic still talk in ignorance; for instance, “miracles”
are said to be part of the “supernatural” realm (that
is, where God does stuff) in the Bible whereas “natural events” are said to be distinct and in the “nature
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